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UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE AND
INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Elkins
77 Ill. 2d 384, 396 N.E.2d 528 (1979)
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Elkins,I the Supreme Court of Illinois
faced the novel problem of defining the nature of the interplay between
uninsured motorist insurance 2 and interspousal tort immunity. The issue before the court was whether an insured woman, who is unable to
recover damages from her tortfeasor husband because of interspousal
immunity, is nonetheless "legally entitled to recover" from him in
terms of an uninsured motorist policy. The Elkins court held that a
wife is legally entitled to recover under such circumstances, 3 explaining
that a husband's ability to invoke the defense of interspousal immunity
is relevant only to his wife's right to enforce payment and does not
affect her right to recover. 4 The court considered interspousal immunity to be a personal defense which cannot be raised to benefit the insurance company. 5
This case comment will first examine the nature and history of
uninsured motorist coverage and discuss the various judicial interpretations of the standard statutory and insurance policy phrase "legally entitled to recover." It will then trace the history of common law
interspousal immunity in Illinois and examine the effect of the Married
Women's Act 6 on the nature of that immunity. This comment will establish that Illinois precedent does not support the Elkins court's finding that a woman has a viable cause of action in tort against her spouse
in Illinois rendering her "legally entitled to recover" from him. The
resulting weakness of the Elkins rationale will then be discussed. Fi1. 77 111.2d 384, 396 N.E.2d 528 (1979).
2. Uninsured motorist insurance is also commonly referred to as "Innocent Victim Coverage," "Family Protection-Automobile Coverage," and "Family Protection Against Uninsured
Motorists." Plummer, Handling Claims Under Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 1957 INs. L.J. 494.
3. 77 Ill. 2d at 390-91, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
4. 1d. at 390, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
5. 1d. at 389-90, 396 N.E.2d at 530-31.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1973)

[current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1001

(1977)] provides, in pertinent part:
A married woman may, in all cases, sue and be sued without joining her husband with
her, to the same extent as if she were unmarried; provided, that neither husband nor wife
may sue the other for a tort to the person committed during coverture.
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nally, this comment will assess the desirability of the result achieved in
Elkins and question the continued utility of interspousal tort immunity.
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

HistoricalBackground
Uninsured motorist coverage is automobile insurance which compensates the claimant for injuries sustained through the fault of an un7
insured motorist who is financially unable to respond in damages.
The need for this type of insurance became increasingly apparent after
World War II when the number of automobiles in the United States
rapidly increased, resulting in a parallel increase in automobile accidents. While there had always been individuals who were "financially
irresponsible" in that they neither purchased automobile insurance nor
had sufficient funds to respond in damages for their negligence, the
threat posed by such persons became more acute as the number of automobile accidents grew. 9 It was in response to this problem that, in
1956, the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters announced the development and availability of uninsured motorist insurance.' 0 The
coverage was promulgated both to forestall the passage by the states of
compulsory liability insurance laws and to satisfy the public demand
for protection against financially irresponsible motorists."I A majority
of the states, including Illinois,' 2 have now adopted statutes requiring
3
insurance companies to offer such coverage.'
The effect of uninsured motorist insurance is to place the insured
in substantially the same position he would have occupied had the
tortfeasor carried liability insurance.' 4 Although recovery by the
7. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Bank, 109 111.App. 2d 133, 138, 248 N.E.2d 299, 303
(4th Dist. 1969); Van Hoozer v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 219 Kan. 595, 600, 549 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1976);
Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 527, 218 So. 2d 580, 583 (1968).
8. A. WIDiss, A GUIDE To UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 3 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as WIDISS].
9. Id.
10. Id. at 14. For detailed accounts of the activities leading up to the National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters' 1956 endorsement, see Comment, UninsuredMotorist Insurance: California'sLatest Answer to the Problem ofthe FinancialyIrresponsibleMotorist, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 51617; WIDISS, supra note 8, at 3-17.
II. WIDISS, supra note 8, at 14-15.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (1967).
13. For a survey of the states, see Graham, Recent Interpretationsof the Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement, 4 FORUM 160 (April, 1969) at 160 n. I; 20 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 56, 85 n.2 (Winter
1969-70); Uninsured Motorist Protection, a monograph published by The Defense Research Institute, Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin app. A (November, 1968).
14. See Markham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying
Oklahoma law); Bocek v. Inter-Ins. Exch. of the Chicago Motor Club, 369 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind. App.
1977); VII PERSONAL INJURY COMMENTATOR 128, 141-42 (1969). In Illinois, the insured is placed

NOTES AND COMMENTS

claimant from the insurance company is based upon the contract embodied in the policy, 15 the insurer's liability is contingent upon the
claimant's ability to establish that a negligent act was committed by the
6
uninsured motorist and that injury resulted.'
In Illinois,' 7 as in other jurisdictions,' 8 statutes provide that uninsured motorist coverage is for the protection of persons who are "legally entitled to recover" damages from the uninsured motorist. The
interpretation of that phrase has engendered much confusion. ' 9 When,
as in Elkins, the insured is unable to recover damages directly from the
tortfeasor because of a statutory or common law defense or immunity,
the controversy lies in whether the insured is nonetheless "legally enti20
tled to recover" within the meaning of his uninsured motorist policy.
Conflicting Interpretationsof the Phrase "Legally Entitled To Recover"
A few jurisdictions have construed the phrase "legally entitled to
recover" to require that the claimant obtain a judgment against the un2
insured motorist before he is entitled to the benefits of his coverage. '
in substantially the same position he would have occupied had the tortfeasor obtained the minimum statutory coverage required by the Safety Responsibility Law, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 952, § 7200 to 7-215 (1965). Ullman v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 105 Ill. App. 2d 408, 244 N.E.2d 827 (3d Dist.
1969); Kirkland, Recent Developments in Illinois Casualty Insurance Law, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 18,
33 (1973).
15. See McMahon v. Coronet Ins. Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 704, 286 N.E.2d 631 (lst Dist. 1972);
DeLuca v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 76, 268 N.Y.S.2d 289, 215 N.E.2d
482 (1966) Sahloff v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 171 N.W.2d 914 (1969); Widiss,
Perspectives on UninsuredMotorist Coverage, 62 Nw. L. REV. 497, 505-09 n.44 (1967).
16. Wilhelm v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 60 111.App. 3d 894, 377 N.E.2d 62 (1st Dist.
1978); Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 285 N.C. 313, 204 S.E.2d 829 (1974); Sahloff v.
Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 171 N.W.2d 914 (1969).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (1967).
18. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 27-7-5-1 (1971) (Burns); KAN. STAT. ANN. §40-284
(1968); LA. REV. STAT. § 22:1406(D) (1978); 36 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3636 (1971); Wis. STAT.
§ 204.30(5)(a) (1975).
19. See WIDISS, supra note 8, at §§ 2.17-2.28.
20. Questions have arisen regarding whether the following persons are "legally entitled to
recover" under an uninsured motorist policy: a plaintiff who is barred by parent-child immunity
from suing her minor daughter in tort (Markham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 703
(10th Cir. 1972) (applying Oklahoma law)); a plaintiff who is barred by the state's workmen's
compensation act from suing his fellow employee for injuries resulting from the employee's negligence (Hopkins v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 41 Mich. App. 635, 200 N.W.2d 784 (1972)); a plaintiff
who is unable to sue a hit-and-run driver in tort because she does not know his identity (Basore v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 626 (Mo. App. 1963)); a plaintiff who is barred from bringing a tort
claim against the uninsured motorist by the statute of limitations (Brown v. Lumbermens Mut.
Cas. Co., 285 N.C. 313, 204 S.E.2d 829 (1974)); and an administrator of an insured's estate making
a claim under the deceased's uninsured motorist policy after expiration of the statutory period for
bringing wrongful death actions (Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Bank, 109 I11.App. 2d 133,
248 N.E.2d 299 (4th Dist. 1969)).
21. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1967) (applying Virginia law); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Girtman, 113 Ga. App. 54, 147 S.E.2d 364
(1966).

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

A more widely-accepted interpretation is that the insured must have an
enforceable claim against the uninsured tortfeasor. 22 In other words,
the claimant must be under no legal disability from recovering damages from the uninsured motorist in that particular jurisdiction. A
third construction, adhered to by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Elkins, 23 is gaining wide acceptance. 24 This view is that the phrase "legally entitled to recover" means that the claimant can establish the
elements of a valid cause of action against the tortfeasor regardless of
whether the claimant would be able to recover damages in a direct action against him. 25 The phrase is interpreted as simply denoting the
existence of fault on the part of the uninsured motorist. 26 This interpretation presupposes that a defense or immunity available to the
tortfeasor is personal to him and may not be invoked to benefit the
27
insurance company.
In determining whether a tortfeasor's immunity may be raised by a
third party, courts have carefully scrutinized the nature of the immunity which exists in their particular jurisdictions. 28 They have decided
whether the immunity merely bars enforcement of a remedy by the injured party or whether it prevents a cause of action from accruing in
the first place. 29 It is only in the latter case that a third party may
30
invoke the immunity as a defense in an action by the injured party.
When the immunity prevents a cause of action from arising, an insured
22. See, e.g., Markham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1972)
(applying Oklahoma law); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Bank, 109 111.App. 2d 133, 248
N.E.2d 299 (4th Dist. 1969); Hopkins v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 41 Mich. App. 635, 200 N.W.2d
784 (1972); Noland v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 413 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. App. 1967); Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 285 N.C. 313, 204 S.E.2d 829 (1974).
23. 77 111.2d at 390. 396 N.E.2d at 531.
24. See, e.g., Hettel v. Rye, 251 Ark. 868, 475 S.W.2d 536 (1972); Van Hoozer v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 219 Kan. 595, 549 P.2d 1354 (1976); Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 218 So.
2d 580 (1968); Guillot v. Travelers Indem. Co., 338 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 1976); Gremillion v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 1974); DeLuca v. Motor Vehicle Accident
Indem. Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 76, 268 N.Y.S.2d 289, 215 N.E.2d 482 (1966); Sahloffv. Western Cas. &
Sur. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 171 N.W.2d 914 (1969); Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 632, 651-53 (1976) and cases
cited therein.
25. 77 111.2d at 390, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
26. Id. at 388. 390, 396 N.E.2d at 530, 531.
27. See id. at 390, 396 N.E.2d at 531. In the related area of liability insurance, one commentator has noted that if a policy carries no immunity endorsement under which the insured and
insurer agree that the insured's immunity is preserved for the benefit of the insurer, the majority of
jurisdictions still find that the immunity is available to the insurer. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW
236-37 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as KEETON].

28. See, e.g., Markham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1972)
(applying Oklahoma law); Guillot v. Travelers Indem. Co., 338 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 1976).
29. See, e.g., Markham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1972)
(applying Oklahoma law); Bodenhagen v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 306, 95 N.W.2d 822
(1959).
30. See id.
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victim is not considered "legally entitled to recover" in terms of his
uninsured motorist coverage. 3 1 A review of the history of interspousal
immunity is essential to an understanding of the nature of that immunity in Illinois and of its effect on an insured's legal entitlement to recover under his uninsured motorist endorsement.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY

InterspousalImmunity at Common Law
It is often said that at common law husband and wife were considered one and the husband was the one. 3 2 A married woman was hampered by many legal disabilities which rendered her inferior to her
husband under the law. She could not own separate property nor could
she institute a lawsuit without joining her husband as a party. 33 Any
right of action she may have had was enforceable only by him. 34 Furthermore, two obstacles precluded a married woman from suing her
husband. The first was a procedural difficulty: the husband, in enforcing the right of his wife as plaintiff, would be suing himself as defendant. 35 The second obstacle was that any recovery obtained by the wife
would immediately become her husband's property, thus making her
36
suit an exercise in futility.
Chief Judge Cardozo, speaking for the Court of Appeals of New
York in Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co. ,37 espoused the view
that a husband's common law immunity from suit by his wife barred
only her remedy, not her cause of action. In Schubert, the plaintiff
sued her husband's employer in tort, seeking damages for injuries she
sustained as a result of her spouse's negligence. Because the accident
had occurred during the course of her husband's employment, the
plaintiff based her claim on the doctrine of respondeatsuperior.38 After
31. Markham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying
Oklahoma law).
32. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 133,
101 N.E.2d 547, 548 (1951); Note, Interspousal Tort Suits in Illinois, 48 Nw. L. REV. 75, 76-78
(1953). While this statement frequently is quoted, Professor Prosser has noted that it is not entirely accurate in that the criminal law regarded husband and wife as separate entities. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 859 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as PROSSER].
33. PROSSER, supra note 32, at 859-60.

34. Welch v. Davis, 410 I11.130, 133, 101 N.E.2d 547, 548 (1951).
35. Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 505, 109 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1952); Welch v. Davis, 410 I11.
130, 133, 101 N.E.2d 547, 548-49 (1951); Note, Interspousal Tort Suits in Illinois, 48 Nw. L. REV.
75, 82-83 (1953).
36. Id.
37. 249 N.Y. 258, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
38. Respondeat superior is a Latin phrase meaning "let the master answer." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979). The doctrine of respondeat superior is that a master will be
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acknowledging that the plaintiff could not sue her husband in tort at
common law, the court affirmed the lower court judgment in her favor.
It stated that a trespass upon the wife "does not cease to be an unlawful
act, though the law exempts the husband from liability for the damage."' 39 The court found that others could not hide behind the husband's immunity.4 0 This view has been adopted by many
42
jurisdictions 4' and has been adhered to in some Illinois decisions.
But in Heckendorn v. First National Bank of Ottawa, 3 the
Supreme Court of Illinois voiced the opposing view: not only was the
wife's remedy barred at common law, but, in addition, no cause of action on her part could exist. 44 This view is not peculiar to Illinois, but
has been accepted in many other jurisdictions. 45 The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts has gone so far as to state that the fact that no cause of
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of his servant which were committed during the course of
his employment. H. HENN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES 132-33 (1972). The master is vicariously liable even if he did not authorize his
servant to act negligently or even to perform the particular act. Id.
39. 249 N.Y. at 256-57, 164 N.E. at 43.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Davis v. Harrod, 407 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Husband is liable for his
wife's negligence while she was driving a car owned by him. A District of Columbia statute made
the driver of a car the agent of the owner in the event of an accident.); Edmunds v. Edmunds, 353
F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1972) (Wife is allowed to recover from owner of a car husband was driving
when he negligently injured her.); McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 180, 146 So.
877 (1933) (Court acknowledged that a wife may recover from her husband's employer for the
husband's negligence. However, the wife was denied recovery because she did not establish that
her husband was engaged in his employer's business when the accident occurred.).
42. See, e.g., Herget Nat'l Bank v. Berardi, 64 Il1. 2d 467, 356 N.E.2d 529 (1976); Welch v.
Davis, 410 I1. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951) (Administrator of deceased wife's estate may bring
statutory wrongful death action on behalf of minor children against estate of deceased husband.);
Tallios v. Tallios, 345 Ill. App. 387, 103 N.E.2d 507 (Ist Dist. 1952) (Wife can recover from her
husband's employer for injuries sustained through her husband's negligence arising in the course
of his employment.).
43. 19 Ill. 2d 190, 166 N.E.2d 571 (1960).
44. Id. at 194, 166 N.E.2d at 573.
45. See, e.g., Saunders v. Hill, 57 Del. 519, 202 A.2d 807 (1964); Magee v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
276 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 1972) (applying Mississippi law); Ensminger v. Ensminger, 222 Miss.
799, 77 So. 2d 308 (1955); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Wooley v. Parker,
222 Tenn. 104, 432 S.W.2d 882 (1968). But see, Tallios v. Tallios, 345 I1. App. 387, 393, 103
N.E.2d 507, 510 (1st Dist. 1952) wherein the court stated: "'Theweight of authority is to the effect
that the marital immunity of the spouse does not mean that there is no right of action, but merely
denies the remedy against the spouse and does not destroy the right of action against the master."
It is interesting to note that one year prior to the Heckendorn decision, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin had stated unequivocally that a wife had no cause of action in Illinois at common law.
Bodenhagen v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 306, 3 10b, 95 N.W.2d 822, 823 (1959). In Bodenhagen, the plaintiff sued the defendant insurance company seeking damages for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident caused by her husband's negligence. The defendant had issued a
policy to the plaintiffs husband insuring him against liability arising from the negligent operation
of his automobile. The plaintiff and her husband were Wisconsin residents, but the accident had
occurred in Illinois. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied Illinois law. The court initially
found for the plaintiff, holding that she could recover from the defendant despite her inability to
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action could arise between spouses at common law is too well settled to
46
require citation of authority.
The nature of interspousal immunity at common law is today a
topic of merely historical interest in Illinois, for the immunity is now
codified in section 1001 of the Married Women's Act. 47 Nearly twenty
years prior to Elkins, in the Heckendorn4 8 decision, the Supreme Court
of Illinois interpreted that provision to mean that no cause of action
can arise in tort between spouses. The following section will review
the history of Illinois' Married Women's Act and set forth a chronology
of judicial interpretations of the legislation, including that imparted in
Heckendorn.
Illinois' Married Women's Acts
In 1861, Illinois adopted the first in a series of Married Women's
Acts. 49 That statute provided that a married woman could own, acquire and convey property in her own right as though she were unmarried.5 0 In 1869, a statute was enacted allowing a married woman "to
receive, use and possess her own earnings and to sue for the same in her
own name, free from interference from her husband or his creditors."' S
Five years later, the rights of a married woman were again enlarged.
The 1874 law provided that a married woman could sue "in all cases"
without joining her husband.5 2 As late as 1952, the provisions of Illinois' Married Women's Act remained substantially the same as those
53
promulgated by the legislature in 1874.
Prior to the 1952 decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in
recover damages in a suit against her husband under Illinois law. 5 Wis. 2d at 310a, 92 N.W.2d at
762.
On rehearing, the Bodenhagen court stated that the law of the domicile, Wisconsin, should be
applied to determine the existence and nature of interspousal immunity. But the court stated:
We withdraw that portion of the original opinion wherein we interpreted Illinois law to
hold that . . .[interspousal] immunity barred only the remedy and not the cause of
action. There is no question but that such immunity at common law was substantive in
nature.
5 Wis. 2d at 31Ob, 95 N.W.2d at 823, citing, inter alia, Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 551, 78
N.E.2d 637 (1948).
46. Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 551, 78 N.E.2d 637, 638 (1948).
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1001 (1977) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1973)). See
note 6 supra for the text of that statute.
48. 19 Ill. 2d 190, 166 N.E.2d 571 (1960).
49. 1861 ILL. LAWS 143. See Brandt v. Keller, 413 Il. 503, 506, 109 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1952).

50. Id.
51. 1869 ILL. LAWS 255, § I. See 413 Ill. at 506, 109 N.E.2d at 730-31.
52.
53.

1874 ILL. LAWS 576, §§ 1-21. See 413 Il. at 507, 109 N.E.2d at 731 (1952).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1951) provided in pertinent part:

[A] married woman may, in all cases, sue and be sued without joining her husband with
her, to the same extent as if she were unmarried, and an attachment or judgment in such
action may be enforced by or against her as if she were a single woman.
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Brandt v. Keller,54 no case had directly addressed the question of
whether the Married Women's Act of 1874 had changed the common
law rule that a wife could not sue her husband in tort. 55 In Brandt, the
court found that the Act gave a married woman that right which she
had not enjoyed at common law. The plaintiff in Brandt sued her former husband for damages resulting from personal injuries she sustained during their marriage while riding in an automobile driven by
him. In deciding to allow the plaintiffs action against her former
spouse, the Brandt court examined the legislature's intent in enacting
the Married Women's Act of 1874. The court found the Act reflected a
legislative purpose to establish the separate identity of a married woman in all litigation. 6 The statutory phrase "in all cases" ' 57 was.liter-

ally construed to mean "[in] all actions against all persons, including
her husband ....,.58
But soon after the Brandt decision, in 1953, the Illinois legislature
amended the Act, adding the proviso that "neither husband nor wife
may sue the other for a tort to the person committed during coverture." 59 This amendment clearly reflects the legislature's dissatisfaction
with the Brandt court's interpretation of the Married Women's Act.
But beyond the purpose of invalidating that construction, it is difficult
54. 413 Ill.
503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952).
55. Although Illinois courts had not directly addressed the issue, three cases had dealt with it
indirectly. In Main v. Main, 46 Ill.
App. 106 (3d Dist. 1892), the court denied a married woman's
right to sue her husband in tort for acts committed before their divorce without reference to the
prevailing Married Women's Act. Later, in Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill.
App. 164 (3d
Dist. 1933), the court denied the right of a minor child to sue his father in tort, noting that the
situation was similar to that of one spouse suing the other. In 195 1, the Supreme Court of Illinois,
in Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951), allowed the administrator of the estate of a
deceased woman to bring a wrongful death action against the executor of her husband's will. The
suit was initiated on behalf of a surviving minor child. The court based its decision to allow
recovery on two factors: first, the true parties in interest were the child and the husband's executor; and, second, the Wrongful Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1949), created a statutory right of action independent of any common law disabilities.
For discussions of the effect of the married women's acts on interspousal immunity, see generally PROSSER, supra note 32, at 861-64; Note, Torts Between Husband and Wfe,30 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 343 (1952).
56. 413 Ill. at 513, 109 N.E.2d at 734.
57. See note 6 supra for the pertinent text.
58. 413 Ill.
at 513, 109 N.E.2d at 734.
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1953). In common legal usage, "coverture" means "the condition or state of a married woman." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 330 (5th ed. 1979). The term is
sometimes used to describe the legal disability which arose from the status of coverture at common law. Id. For example, in Osborn v. Horine, 19 111.123 (1857), the court stated:
The very term coverture implies that . . .[the wife] is, during its continuance, under the
protection of her husband, and the common law will not allow her to do anything which
may prejudice her rights or interests, without his advice, consent and approval. In this
respect, she is incapable of acting alone.
Id. at 125 (emphasis in original).
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to determine the precise nature of the legislature's intent. 60 The 1953
modification could have been designed either to abolish a wife's right
to sue her husband in tort which the Married Women's Act of 1874 had
created or to restate the common law rule of interspousal tort immunity
which had never ceased to be the law.
In Heckendorn v. FirstNational Bank, 6' a 1960 case, the Supreme
Court of Illinois adopted the view that in promulgating the Married
Women's Act of 1874, the legislature had given a woman the right to
sue her husband in tort which she had not had at common iaw. 62 The
court stated that by amending the Act in 1953, the legislature withdrew
63
that right which it had previously created.
The issue in Heckendorn was whether a widow has the right to sue
her deceased husband's estate for a tort committed by him during coverture. The widow plaintiff contended that the Married Women's Act
as amended has no application after a marriage has been terminated by
death. The Supreme Court of Illinois disagreed. Finding that the legislature had created a statutory disability during the lifetime of husband and wife, the Heckendorn court stated that the legislature had
intended to prevent a cause of action from coming into being. 64 "If a
cause of action could not exist in favor of the wife and against the tort'6 5
feasor husband, it could not survive his death.
Six years after Heckendorn, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed
the decision in a factually similar case, Wartell v. Formusa.66 As in
60. No legislative history is available relating to the 1953 amendment to the Married Women's Act.
61. 19 I11.
2d 190, 166 N.E.2d 571 (1960).
62. Id. at 194, 166 N.E.2d at 573.
63. Id. at 195, 166 N.E.2d at 574.
64. Id. at 193, 166 N.E.2d at 573.
65. Id. But see Calvert v. Morgan, 41 I1.App. 2d 23, 190 N.E.2d I (2d Dist. 1963), where the
court would not construe the 1953 amendment of the Married Women's Act to bar wrongful death
actions brought by the administrator of the estate of a deceased wife on behalf of her dependent
children against the estate of her deceased husband. In Calvert, the husband had shot and killed
his wife before committing suicide.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois faced a problem similar
to that in Calvert in Rogers v. Jackson, 416 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Ill.
1976). In Rogers, the administrator of the deceased wife's estate brought a wrongful death action on behalf of the surviving
children against the husband. The administrator contended that because of the husband's wrongful acts in driving an automobile in which his wife was a passenger, the wife suffered injuries
which caused her death. The district court allowed the wrongful death action, finding that interspousal immunity did not apply to the case because the true parties in interest were the children
and the husband. Id. at 1126. The court noted that domestic tranquility would not be fostered by
disallowing the action, because there was no domestic tranquility to preserve following the wife's
death. Id. To add support to its view that interspousal immunity had no applicability to the case,
the court indicated that the defendant had been the deceased's husband "until the moment of her
death." Id. at 1128.
66. 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
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Heckendorn, the court in Wartell denied a woman's action against the
estate of her deceased husband for injuries she sustained through her
husband's negligence during their marriage.
In 1967, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District
decided Packenham v. Miltimore.67 There the court allowed a wife to
sue her husband for a premarital tort, distinguishing the facts of the
case from those in Heckendorn and Wartell in which the torts had been
committed during marriage. The Packenham court acknowledged that
the earlier cases had interpreted the Married Women's Act to prevent a
68
woman's cause of action against her husband from coming into being.
Finally, in a 1976 case, Herget National Bank v. Berardi,69 the
Supreme Court of Illinois again referred to the Heckendorn and
Wartell rulings. In dictum, the Herget court stated that those cases had
presented the question of whether a woman has the right to bring an
action against her deceased husband's estate for a tort committed during their marriage. 70 "This court held . . . that the action was barred
71
by the amendment enacted after the decision in Brandt.'
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court of Illinois
decided Allstate Insurance Co. v. Elkins. 72 As will be shown, the court
ignored Heckendorn and the cases following its interpretation of the
nature of interspousal immunity in Illinois, choosing instead to redefine
that immunity.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE Co. v. ELKINS

Statement of the Case
Helen Elkins and her minor daughter were injured in an automobile accident. 73 The car in which they were riding was driven by Mr.
74
Elkins, whose negligence caused the accident.
67. 89 111.
App. 2d 452, 232 N.E.2d 42 (2d Dist. 1967).
68. Id. at 455, 232 N.E.2d at 44.
69. 64 Ill. 2d 467, 356 N.E.2d 529 (1976). In Herget, Darolde Petri piloted a plane that
crashed, killing him and his wife. The plaintiff, Herget National Bank, as administrator of the
wife's estate, brought an action under the Wrongful Death Act (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1,2
(1973)) for the benefit of decedent's minor children. The executor of Mr. Petri's estate was named
as the defendant. The Supreme Court of Illinois allowed the action, notwithstanding that Mrs.
Petri could not have maintained an action against her husband or his estate had she survived. The
court found that since the plaintiff was asserting independent rights of the surviving children and
not rights of the deceased wife, the Married Women's Act did not bar the action.
70. Id. at 472, 356 N.E.2d at 532.
71. Id.

72. 77 111.2d 384, 396 N.E.2d 528 (1979).
73. Id. at 386, 396 N.E.2d at 529.
App. 3d 62, 63, 381 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ist Dist. 1978).
74. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elkins, 63 111.
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Mrs. Elkins was "insured" under her husband's 75 automobile liability insurance policy which had been issued to him by Allstate Insurance Company. 76 An exclusionary clause in the policy rendered Mr.
77
Elkins "uninsured" with respect to Mrs. Elkins.
The insurance policy also contained an uninsured motorist section
which provided:
Allstate will pay all sums which the insured . . . shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile. . . caused by accident
and arising out of the use
78
.. . of such uninsured automobile.
Mrs. Elkins and her daughter filed claims under the uninsured motorist
portion of the policy. Allstate refused to pay and the claims were sub79
mitted to arbitration.
Prior to a decision by the arbitrator, Allstate brought a declaratory
judgment action in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,80 seeking a ruling that interspousal immunity prevented Mrs. Elkins from
recovering. 8' Before the trial court rendered a judgment, the arbitrator
awarded the daughter $1,300 and found that Mrs. Elkins' injuries
amounted to $18,500.82 Relying on the Illinois Married Women's
Act, 83 the arbitrator determined, however, that Mr. Elkins was immune
from suit by his wife and that she was therefore not "legally entitled to
84
recover" damages from him.

The Circuit, Appellate and Supreme Court Decisions
The circuit court agreed that Mrs. Elkins was not legally entitled to
recover for her injuries8 5 and granted Allstate's motion for summary
86
judgment in the declaratory judgment action.
75. Mr. Elkins was the named insured. 77 Ill. 2d at 386, 396 N.E.2d at 529.
76. Hereinafter referred to as "Allstate."
77. The liability portion of the policy excluded "bodily injury to any person who is related by
blood, marriage, or adoption to an insured against whom claim is made if such person resides in
the same household as such insured." 77 111.2d at 387, 396 N.E.2d at 530.
78. 77 111.2d at 386-87, 396 N.E.2d at 529-30 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 387, 396 N.E.2d at 530. The policy provided that all claims involving the uninsured motorist provision were to be submitted to arbitration. 63 I11.App. 3d at 63, 381 N.E.2d at
2.
80. 77 111.2d at 387, 396 N.E.2d at 530.
81. 63 11. App. 3d at 63, 381 N.E.2d at 2.
82. 77 111.2d at 387, 396 N.E.2d at 530.
83.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 60, § 1 (1973).

84. 77 111.2d at 387, 396 N.E.2d at 530.
85. Id. The circuit court also found that Mrs. Elkins' failure to file a timely proceeding to
vacate the arbitrator's ruling made his decision binding on her. The procedure for vacating an
arbitrator's award is governed by section 112 of the Uniform Arbitration Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
10, § 112 (1977).
86. 77 Ill. 2d at 386, 396 N.E.2d at 529.
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On appeal, Mrs. Elkins argued that the trial court had erred in
ruling that interspousal immunity precluded her from recovering under
her husband's policy. 87 The appellate court reversed and remanded,
holding that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority in determining
88
that interspousal immunity precluded Mrs. Elkins from recovering.
The court further held that a third party, in this case the insurance
company, cannot raise the defense of interspousal immunity and that
the capacity of spouses to sue one another in tort has no bearing in a
claim against the insurance company on the insurance contract. 89 The
appellate court construed the phrase "legally entitled to recover" to
mean that the claimant must establish that the uninsured motorist was
at fault and that damages resulted. 90
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court judgment, ruling for Mrs. Elkins. 9 1 It concurred in the appellate court's
interpretation of "legally entitled to recover" 9 2 and found that Allstate
could not invoke the defense of interspousal immunity to avoid Mrs.
93
Elkins' claim.
Reasoning of the Majority
The Elkins court 94 grounded its reasoning on the premise that a
woman has a cause of action in tort against her husband in Illinois
despite her lack of remedy. 95 In establishing this principle, the court
examined Illinois law and found that prior to the 1953 amendment of
the Married Women's Act 96 one spouse could sue the other in tort during coverture. 97 It cited Brandt v. Keller 98 for that proposition and interpreted the amendment to confer immunity on the tortfeasor spouse,
87. 63 11. App. 3d at 63, 381 N.E.2d at 2. Mrs. Elkins also argued that the trial court had
erred in holding that she was bound by the arbitrator's award for failing to challenge it within
ninety days. Id. See note 85 supra.
App. 3d at 65, 381 N.E.2d at 3. The court stated that the arbitrator's award had to
88. 63 111.
be vacated. Id.
App. 3d at 65-66, 381 N.E.2d at 4.
89. 63 I11.
90. Id. at 66, 381 N.E.2d at 4.
2d at 391, 396 N.E.2d at 532. The court excused Mrs. Elkins' failure to file a timely
91. 77 Ill.
application to vacate the arbitrator's award. Id. Because the declaratory judgment action involved the same issue the arbitrator had resolved, the court stated that Mrs. Elkins' filing of any
further action would have been a useless act. Id.
2d at 390, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
92. 77 111.
93. Id. at 390-91, 396 N.E.2d at 531-32.
94. Chief Justice Goldenhersh authored the majority opinion.
2d at 390, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
95. 77 I11.
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1951). See note 6 supra.
2d at 390, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
97. 77 I11.
98. 413 111.503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952).
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but not to destroy the victim spouse's cause of action.9 9 The court drew
an analogy between interspousal immunity and a statute of limitations,
which can be waived by the defendant and which does not affect the
existence of a cause of action on the part of the plaintiff.i °°
Thus, the court cited a New York' 0 ' and a Wisconsin 10 2 decision
in which an insured, who was barred from suing the uninsured
tortfeasor by the tort statute of limitations, was allowed to recover
under his uninsured motorist policy. The New York and Wisconsin
courts ruled that the defense of the statute of limitations was not available to the insurance company, for the statute merely barred a remedy-not the cause of action.
The Elkins court distinguished these cases from those in which
failure to bring an uninsured motorist claim within the statutory period
of limitations for wrongful death actions rendered the administrator of
the deceased insured's estate not "legally entitled to recover" in terms
of the policy. 03 The Elkins court pointed out that in the latter cases the
of
period for instituting wrongful death actions was a statutory element
°4
the cause of action itself-not merely a statute of limitations."
Finding that the question of whether a tortfeasor's immunity can
be invoked by the insurance company in a claim under an uninsured
motorist endorsement was one of first impression in Illinois, 0 5 the Elkins court turned to cases from other jurisdictions which had examined
the issue. It looked first to a Louisiana case, Guillot v. Travelers Indemnity Co. ,106 which is factually similar to Elkins. The Guillot court allowed the wife's recovery under an uninsured motorist endorsement. It
ruled that interspousal immunity did not bar the wife's recovery in that,
in Louisiana, the defense was personal to her 7tortfeasor husband and
0
was not available to the insurance company.'
The Elkins court distinguished Markham v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co.,

'08

a case in which the United States Court of

99. 77 I11.2d at 390, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
100. Id.
101. DeLuca v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 76, 268 N.Y.S.2d 289, 215
N.E.2d 482 (1966).
102. Sahloffv. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 171 N.W.2d 914 (1969).
103. 77 11. 2d at 389, 396 N.E.2d at 531, citing Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Bank, 109
I11.App. 2d 133, 248 N.E.2d 299 (4th Dist. 1969); Bocek v. Inter-Insurance Exch. of the Chicago
Motor Club, 369 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind. App. 1977).
104. 77 Ill. 2d at 389, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
105. Id. at 388, 396 N.E.2d at 530.
106. 338 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 1976).
107. Id. at 336.
108. 464 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying Oklahoma law).
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Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied Oklahoma law. In contrast to
Guillot, the Markham court found that parent-child immunity rendered the injured parent not "legally entitled to recover" under her uninsured motorist policy. The plaintiff in Markham had been injured in
an automobile driven by her daughter. The Tenth Circuit found that
since a parent has no cause of action in tort against her child in
Oklahoma, she can not be legally entitled to recover for injuries sustained through the child's negligence in a claim against the insurance
company. 1°9 The Elkins court considered Markham distinguishable
because of the court's premise that, in Illinois, a woman has a cause of
action against her tortfeasor husband although she cannot enforce a
judgment against him.
The court found Noland v. FarmersInsurance Exchange, 0 a case
presenting a factual situation similar to that in Elkins, to be inapposite
because of the wording of the uninsured motorist policy. In Noland,
the policy provided that the insurer would pay all sums "which the
owner. . . of an uninsured motor vehicle would be legally responsible
to pay as damages to the insured."'I The Noland court denied the
wife's claim because of her uninsured motorist husband's immunity
from suit by her.
In Elkins, however, the Illinois Supreme Court construed the
phrase "legally entitled to recover" in the uninsured motorist policy as
merely denoting fault on the part of the uninsured motorist." 12 Having
decided that a wife has a viable cause of action in tort against her husband in Illinois notwithstanding her lack of remedy, the court reasoned
that the husband's immunity from suit does not inure to the benefit of
the insurance company nor affect the wife's legal right to recover.' 13
Finally, the court noted that the intent of the parties must be given
foremost consideration and that any ambiguity contained in an insurance policy should be construed in favor of the insured.' 14 Relying on
those rules of construction, the court concluded that the parties could
not have intended that Allstate would deny Mrs. Elkins' claim on the
happenstance that the uninsured tortfeasor turned out to be her
spouse.' 15
109.
110.
II1.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 705, 708.
413 S.w.2d 530 (Mo. App. 1967).
Id. at 532, quoting from defendant's brief (emphasis added by the court).
77 111.2d at 390, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
Id.
Id. at 390-91, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
Id. at 391, 396 N.E.2d at 531.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Reasoning of the Dissent
Justice Ryan, joined by Justice Underwood, dissented from the
majority opinion." 6 He found the majority's assertion that a woman
has a cause of action against her husband despite her lack of remedy8
7
untenable in light of Heckendorn" and subsequent Illinois cases"
which have interpreted the 1953 amendment to the Married Women's
Act as preventing a cause of action from accruing.' '9 The dissent relied
on the principle of stare decisis, concluding that the majority had
usurped legislative authority by bestowing a new meaning on the Mar20
ried Women's Act.'
Analysis of the Opinion
The Elkins majority found the issue of whether a husband's immunity from a tort action by his wife may be raised as a defense by a third
party to be one of first impression in Illinois.' 2' Accordingly, the court
looked to authority from other jurisdictions 22 to substantiate its finding that a husband's immunity is solely a personal defense. 2 3 Seemingly as an afterthought, the majority examined Illinois statutory and
case law relating to the nature of interspousal immunity in its own jurisdiction.
The majority found that prior to the 1953 amendment of Illinois'
Married Women's Act, one spouse could sue the other in tort. 124 In
116. Id. at 391-95, 396 N.E.2d at 532-34.
117. Heckendorn v. First Nat'l Bank, 19 111.2d 190, 166 N.E.2d 571 (1960).
118. 77 Ill. 2d at 390-95, 396 N.E.2d at 532-34. Herget Nat'l Bank v. Berardi, 64 Ill. 2d 467,
356 N.E.2d 529 (1976); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Packenham v.
Miltimore, 89 I11.App. 2d 452, 232 N.E.2d 42 (2d Dist. 1967). See text accompanyinng notes 6171 supra.
119. The dissent explained that:
[T]he statute has not been construed as creating an immunity from suit that can be
raised as a defense or waived by one spouse when sued by the other, as the majority
opinion holds. Under the previous construction, the cause of action does not exist in
favor of the injured spouse against the tortfeasor. Under our previous construction, the
fact that the uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy permits payment of the
sum the insured "shall be legally entitled to recover" would not, in our case, permit the
injured wife to recover under the policy, because she has no cause of action against her
husband and therefore is not legally entitled to recover from him.
77 Il1 2d at 392-93, 396 N.E.2d at 532.
120. Id. at 395, 396 N.E.2d at 533-34.
121. Id. at 388, 396 N.E.2d at 530.
122. Id. at 389, 396 N.E.2d at 530-31, citing Guillot v. Travelers Indem. Co., 338 So. 2d 334
(La. App. 1976); DeLuca v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 76, 268 N.Y.S.2d
289, 215 N.E.2d 482 (1966); and Sahloff v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 171 N.W.2d
914 (1969).
123. 77 Ill. 2d at 389-90, 396 N.E.2d at 530-31.
124. Id. at 390, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
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citing Brandt v. Keller, 25 the Elkins court presumably accepted
Brandt's view that the Married Women's Act of 1874 had created a
cause of action in tort between spouses. The court stated that the effect
of the amendment of the Act in 1953, the year after Brandt was decided, was not to destroy a wife's cause of action against her husband,
but rather to confer immunity on him.' 2 6 But as pointed out in the
dissenting opinion, 27 there are subsequent Illinois cases to the contrary. In Heckendorn v. First National Bank, 128 the Supreme Court of
Illinois stated unequivocally that by enacting the 1953 amendment to
the Married Women's Act, the legislature had intended to prevent a
cause of action from coming into being. l2 9 Several Illinois cases have
130
since followed that view.
Without reference to any of these Illinois cases, the Elkins court
set forth a new interpretation of the effect of the 1953 amendment. In
so doing, the majority, as the dissent correctly noted, acted in disregard
of the principle of stare decisis. Under that doctrine, a court is bound to
follow judicial precedent unless it can be shown that a serious detriment will arise prejudicial to the public welfare. 131
The dissenting opinion indicated that the Married Women's Act
has been amended at various times since the Heckendorn court assessed
the effect of the interspousal immunity provision and the language interpreted in Heckendorn has not been altered. 132 It is well settled that
when the legislature amends an act without changing language which
has been construed by the courts, that is strong evidence that the legislature approves the construction. 133 The rationale is that the legislature
125. 413 111.503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952).
126. 77 I11.2d at 390, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
127. Id. at 391-95, 396 N.E.2d at 532-33. See text accompanying notes 116-20 supra.
128. 19 111.2d 190, 166 N.E.2d 571 (1960).
129. Id. at 193, 166 N.E.2d at 573.
130. See text accompanying notes 61-71 supra.
131. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Maki v. Frelk, 40 111.2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
But see Schenk v. Schenk, 100 I11.App. 2d 199, 201, 241 N.E.2d 12, 13 (4th Dist. 1968), stating
that " 'staredecisis' has not been an insuperable barrier to a reconsideration of decisions or principies where adequate cause is shown and impelling changing conditions exist." See also Note,
Maintaining Liberty The Judicial Way, 32 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 230, 233-34 (1954).
The rationale underlying the principle ofstare decisis is that the citizenry is entitled to rely on
decisions of the courts with confidence that they will not be changed from term to term. Chicago
Title & Trust Co. v. Shellaberger, 399 I11.320, 343, 77 N.E.2d 675, 687 (1948). The people must
know that the courts do not intend to usurp legislative powers. Id.
132. 77 I11.2d at 395, 396 N.E.2d at 533.
133. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), rehearingdenied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Union Elec. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 77 11. 2d
364, 396 N.E.2d 510 (1979) and cases cited therein; Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 376 I11.
138, 33 N.E.2d 211 (1941); Bowers v. Green, 2 Ill. 42 (1832); 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.09 (4th ed. 1973).
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is presumed to know the interpretation which has been adopted by the
courts and, by reenactment, gives the new act the same effect as its
predecessor.' 34 This strongly suggests that the Illinois legislature has
adopted or at least acquiesced in the view that no cause of action in tort
can arise between spouses.
The Elkins court may have declined to mention Heckendorn and
the cases affirming its rule 35 because it believed that these cases misconstrued the 1953 legislature's intent. Or, the court may have found
that to accept the established interpretation would necessitate a harsh
result in the case at hand. Whatever the court's motive, the effect of
this omission was to weaken the persuasive impact of the Elkins opinion, which is grounded on the assumption that a tort cause of action
can arise between spouses in Illinois.
Thus, the court's attempt to distinguish Markham v. State Farm
MutualAutomobile InsuranceCo. 136 fails. In Markham, the Tenth Circuit found that the Oklahoma courts had repeatedly held that there is
no cause of action based on negligence between a parent and his child
in Oklahoma. The court denied the plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim
for damages resulting from injuries she sustained through her child's
negligence. It reasoned that the plaintiff could not be "legally entitled
to recover" in terms of her uninsured motorist policy because no tort
cause of action could arise between her and her child. Contrary to the
Elkins court's view of Markham, parent-child immunity in Oklahoma
and interspousal immunity in Illinois are analogous rather than distinct. Just as the Oklahoma courts had held that there is no tort cause
of action between parent and child, 137 Illinois courts have held that no
cause of action can arise between husband and wife. 138 In both instances, the cause of action itself is barred, making the immunity not
merely a personal defense but one which can be invoked by the insurance company. It follows, then, that the .plaintiff is not "legally entitled
to recover" in either case.
Similarly, the Elkins court's attempt to distinguish decisions in
which the plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim was barred by a failure
to seek arbitration within the period of limitations for wrongful death
134. Hupp v. Gray, 73 I11.2d 78, 382 N.E.2d 1211 (1978); City of Champaign v. City of
Champaign Township, 16 I1U.2d 58, 156 N.E.2d 543 (1959).
135. See text accompanying notes 61-71 supra.
136. 464 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying Oklahoma law). See text accompanying notes
108-09 supra.
137. 464 F.2d at 705.
138. See text accompanying notes 61-71 supra.
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actions' 39 was unconvincing. The basis for those holdings was that
bringing suit within the time period required by the applicable wrongful death statute was a condition attached to the administrator's right to
sue. The statutes in question 40 expressly provided that wrongful death
actions must be commenced within the stated time period. Once the
time period expired, no cause of action existed.' 4 ' The result, then, is
similar to, rather than distinguishable from, the interspousal tort situation in Illinois.
In contrast are cases in which the defense of the insured's noncompliance with the tort statute of limitations has been held to be no de42
fense in an action by the insured against the insurance company.
Unlike compliance with the statutory period of limitations for wrongful death actions, compliance with a general statute of limitations is not
an element of the cause of action. 43 Rather, it is a defense which can
be interposed or waived at the defendant's discretion. 44 If suit is filed
after the statute of limitations has run, the cause of action exists
notwithstanding the fact that the remedy is barred.
The Elkins court considered Noland v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 45 a case directly on point, to be unpersuasive. Like Elkins,
Noland involved a woman who brought an uninsured motorist claim
against the insurance company for damages resulting from injuries she
sustained while riding in an automobile driven by her husband. The
Noland court held that interspousal immunity precluded the woman
139. 77 111.2d at 389, 396 NE.2d at 531, citing Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Bank, 109
Ill. App. 2d 133, 248 N.E.2d 299 (4th Dist. 1969); and Bocek v. Inter-Insurance Exch. of the
Chicago Motor Club, 369 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes 103-04
supra.
140. In Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Bank, 109 I11.App. 2d 133, 248 N.E.2d 299 (4th
Dist. 1969), the statute in question was ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ I, 2 (1967). In Bocek v. InterInsurance Exch. of the Chicago Motor Club, 369 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind. App. 1977), the applicable
statute was IC 1971, 34-1-2-2 (Burns Code Ed.).
141. In Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Bank, 109 Il1. App. 2d 133, 248 N.E.2d 299 (4th
Dist. 1969), the court explained the effect of the period of limitations contained in Illinois' Wrongful Death Statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ I, 2 (1967), on the viability of a cause of action for
wrongful death:
The Illinois courts consistently have held that the right of action for wrongful death is
wholly statutory and that the provision in the statute creating the right that requires the
action to be brought within the specified time is a condition attached to the right to sue
and is not merely a statute of limitations . . . . This is unlike a general statute of limitations which may serve as a defense to an action which a defendant may interpose or
waive as he sees fit, but it is a condition of the statute of any right to liability whatsoever.
109 111.App. 2d at 139, 248 N.E.2d at 303 (citations omitted).
142. See text accompanying notes 101-02 supra.
143. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Bank, 109 Ill. App. 2d 133, 139, 248 N.E.2d 299, 303
(4th Dist. 1969).
144. Id. See note 141 supra.
145. 413 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. App. 1967). See text accompanying notes 110-11 supra.
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from recovering from the insurance company. The Elkins court distinguished Noland by finding that the wording of the insurance policy in
Noland was so dissimilar to that in Elkins as to make Noland inapposite. Whether the phrases "legally responsible to pay as damages" (in
Noland) and "legally entitled to recover as damages" (in Elkins) reflect
a substantive difference or merely a difference in point of view is debatable. Since Illinois cases have ruled that a wife is not legally entitled to
recover tort damages from her husband, 14 6 relieving him of legal responsibility to pay them, the semantic difference lacks import. With
that distinction dismantled, Noland cannot be reconciled with the Elkins result.
The Elkins court looked to the intent of the parties in interpreting
the meaning of the insurance policy. 147 It was unwilling to find that the
parties could have intended that the exclusionary clause should invoke
the uninsured motorist provisions and simultaneously deny recovery to
the injured spouse. 148 But viewed from another perspective, it is equally
untenable that Allstate could have intended to refuse to indemnify Mr.
Elkins under the liability provisions of the policy for injuries to his wife
and yet compensate her directly for those injuries. Thus, the better view
is that Allstate's intention was to provide compensation under the uninsured motorist endorsement only when the tortfeasor was not a family
member. 149 The agreement of the insurance company was to pay when
a liability was recognized by law.' 5 0 Because of the husband's immu51
nity, no such liability could be imposed.'
The court noted that ambiguities in an insurance policy should be
construed in favor of the insured. 52 But when read in light of the Illi146. See text accompanying notes 61-71 supra.
147. 77 111.2d at 390-91, 396 N.E.2d at 531, citing Kaufmann v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 76
111.2d 11, 389 N.E.2d 1150 (1979). Accord, Corbin, The Interpretationof Words and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 162 (1965). But see Home Ins. Co. v. Monaco, 405 F. Supp.
321, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1975), indicating that the court may attempt to discern the parties' expectations
only where a term in an insurance policy is ambiguous.
148. 77 111.2d at 391, 396 N.E.2d at 531.
149. A spokesman for a major casualty insurer explained to this author that uninsured motorist insurance was not intended to defeat the function of the family exclusion in automobile liability insurance policies. He indicated that the exclusion is based on the belief that family members
should not be allowed to sue each other for injuries and thereby take advantage of the insurance
company. The spokesman stated that alternative types of insurance are available to family members, such as medical payments, hospitalization, health, life and disability coverage, which can be
purchased to protect a family member against losses caused by another family member's negligent
driving.

150. See

KEETON,

supra note 27, at 237.

151. Id.
152. 77 111.2d at 391, 396 N.E.2d at 531, citing Kaufmann v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 76 I11.
2d 11, 389 N.E.2d 1150 (1979). Accord, Squire v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 69 Ill. 2d 167, 370
N.E.2d 1044 (1977); United Security Ins. Co. v. Mason, 59 111.App. 3d 982, 376 N.E.2d 653 (lst
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nois cases finding that a wife has no cause of action in tort against her
husband, 153 the phrase "legally entitled to recover" should present no
interpretative difficulty. A court may not raise a doubt or ambiguity in
an insurance contract where none exists. 15 4 If Mrs. Elkins had no cause
of action, it should be clear that she was not "legally entitled to recover."
Purpose of the UninsuredMotorist Act
The Elkins court focused narrowly on the language of the insurance contract. In so doing, it failed to look beyond the insurance policy
itself and consider the Uninsured Motorist Act 5 5 which mandates uninsured motorist coverage. Moreover, the court made no mention of
Illinois cases which have discussed the intent of the legislature in enacting this statute.
In Barnes v. Powell, 56 the Supreme Court of Illinois set forth an
expansive interpretation of the Uninsured Motorist Act. The court examined the pu-pose of the Act and found that the legislature had intended that uninsured motorist insurance would protect an insured
157
generally against injuries caused by motorists who are uninsured.
Finding a legislative mandate to protect the innocent victim, the Barnes
court determined that uninsured motorist coverage becomes effective
when no liability insurance is applicable to the victim at the time of an
Dist. 1978); Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 218 So. 2d 580 (1968). See also Widiss,
Perspectiveson UninsuredMotorist Coverage, 62 Nw. L. REV. 497, 510 (1967).
153. See text accompanying notes 61-71 supra.
154. Home Ins. Co. v. Monaco, 405 F. Supp. 321, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1975), citing Brunner v. McCullough, 216 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Pa. 1963); and Burdsall v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 207 Pa.
Super. 228, 217 A.2d 789 (1966).
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (1969).
156. 49 II. 2d 449, 275 N.E.2d 377 (1971). In Barnes, the plaintiff, Mrs. Barnes, was injured
while riding as a passenger in a car driven by defendant Powell. Mrs. Barnes and her husband
were co-owners of the automobile, which was insured by LaSalle National Insurance Company.
A provision in the policy, which had been issued to Mr. Barnes, excluded Mrs. Barnes from liability coverage.
Mrs. Barnes claimed that the defendant, who was uninsured, had caused the accident. She
sought recovery under the uninsured motorist provision of her husband's policy. LaSalle filed an
intervening complaint for a declaratory judgment that the uninsured motorist portion of Mr.
Barnes' policy did not cover the accident because the vehicle in question was insured at the time of
the collision.
Because the court found the purpose of the Uninsured Motorist Act was to protect an insured
generally against injuries caused by uninsured motorists, id. at 454, 275 N.E.2d at 379, the fact
that an uninsured motorist was the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding was
not decisive. -d. The court found that because the plaintiff was excluded from the liability portion of her husband's insurance policy, the automobile was not an insured automobile and the
driver was not an insured driver "notwithstanding that as to all others the automobile and the
driver may have been insured." 49 IlI. 2d at 454, 275 N.E.2d at 380.
157. Id., 275 N.E.2d at 379.
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accident.158 Numerous subsequent Illinois cases have accepted this
view. 159

Although Barnes appears to support the result achieved in Elkins,
it is by no means certain that the legislature intended to allow a woman
to recover under an uninsured motorist endorsement for injuries
caused by her husband. The fact that the Married Women's Act prevents a woman from suing her husband directly for his torts militates
against such a legislative purpose. Nonetheless, the Elkins court could
have profited by noting the expansive views set forth in Barnes and
subsequent cases. To have done so would have obviated a strained
analysis of the phrase "legally entitled to recover." The Elkins court
could have asserted that, despite the literal meaning of the policy, to
deny Mrs. Elkins' claim would be to disregard the purpose of the Uninsured Motorist Act as interpreted by Illinois courts.' 60 The Elkins
court would not then have been constrained to ignore Illinois precedent

nor to turn to foreign jurisdictions for its sole support.
Public Policy Considerations
Although the Elkins decision is in conflict with Illinois precedent,
arguments other than those based on Barnes can be raised in support of
the holding. One is that a wrong was committed and that the innocent
victim should not be denied a remedy.' 6' This argument was advanced
158. Id. at 454, 275 N.E.2d at 380. The court incidentally noted that plaintiffhad an option to
reject the uninsured motorist coverage but had decided to pay an extra premium for the additional
protection.
159. See, e.g., Squire v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 69 Ill. 2d 167, 370 N.E.2d 1044 (1977);
Madison Co. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Goodpasture, 49 11. 2d 555, 276 N.E.2d 289 (1971); Zurich v.
Country Mut. Ins. Co., 65 I11. App. 3d 608, 382 N.E.2d 131 (2d Dist. 1978); Roby v. Illinois Founders Ins. Co., 57 I11. App. 3d 89, 372 N.E.2d 1097 (1st Dist. 1978); Doxtater v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 547, 290 N.E.2d 284 (1st Dist. 1972).
It should be noted, however, that the majority view in Barnes has not been universally accepted. In his dissent in Barnes, Chief Justice Underwood found the legislative intent manifest in
the plain language of the Act, which speaks of protection against injury from an "uninsured motor
vehicle." He criticized the majority for having converted this phrase to mean an "uninsured motorist" in order to accomplish a more desirable result. Justice Underwood found that in promulgating the Uninsured Motorist Act, the legislature had been concerned with multi-car accidents
and that the legislative purpose was to protect against damage resulting from other automobiles
which were not insured. 49 IlI. 2d at 456, 275 N.E.2d at 380. Several Illinois cases have been in
accord with Justice Underwood's more restrictive interpretation of the purpose of the Uninsured
Motorist Act. See, e.g., Stryker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 74 I11. 2d 507, 386 N.E.2d 36 (1978);
Tuthill v. State Farm Ins. Co., 19 IlL. App. 3d 491, 311 N.E.2d 770 (5th Dist. 1974).
160. See Burgo v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 8 I11. App. 3d 259, 290 N.E.2d 371 (Ist Dist. 1972),
where the court found a provision in an uninsured motorist policy shortening the applicable statute of limitations void for placing a limitation on the meaning and purpose of the Uninsured
Motorist Act.
161. For discussion of this issue, see Heckendorn v. First Nat'l Bank, 19 IUI. 2d 190, 194-95,

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

by the plaintiff in Steffa v. Stanley 162 who was injured while riding as a
passenger on her husband's motorcycle which collided with another vehicle. In contending that she should be able to sue her husband in tort,
the plaintiff pointed out that the Illinois constitution provides that
"[elvery person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries
and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely and
promptly.' 63 The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District
stated in Steffa, however, that the Illinois constitution does not mandate a specific form of remedy but merely expresses a philosophy in
favor of providing redress for wrongs. 164 It noted that a court's power
to fashion remedies is limited and that the policy expression in the constitution does not authorize a court to create a cause of action unknown
to common law and expressly prohibited by the Married Women's
Act. 165
Another argument which could be posed in support of the Elkins
holding is that an insured, who generally has no expertise in interpreting the interaction among insurance policy provisions, may reasonably
expect to be protected in a situation like that presented in Elkins and
that his expectations should be fulfilled.' 6 6 But the rebuttal to that position is that a court has the duty to enforce the terms agreed upon by
the contracting parties. It "cannot make for [them] . .,. better agree67
ments than they themselves have been satisfied to conclude."'
The Elkins court failed to apply objectively the doctrine of interspousal immunity as it exists in Illinois to the facts before it. This may
imply judicial discontent with the doctrine itself. 168 Although interspousal immunity is logically consistent with the early theory that husband and wife constituted a single legal entity, 69 that view is no longer
viable in our society.' 70 "Nowhere in the common-law world [today] is
166 N.E.2d 571, 573-74 (1960); Steffa v. Stanley, 39 111. App. 3d 915, 917-18, 350 N.E.2d 886, 88889 (2d Dist. 1976).
162. 39 Ill. App. 3d 915, 350 N.E.2d 886 (2d Dist. 1976).
163. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.

164. 39 I11.
App. 3d at 918, 350 N.E.2d at 888.
165. Id., 350 N.E.2d at 889-90, citing Heckendorn v. First Nat'l Bank, 19 Il.
-2d 190, 194, 166
N.E.2d 571, 573 (1960).

166. See Burgo v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 8 111. App. 3d 259, 290 N.E.2d 371 (1st Dist. 1972).
167. Id. at 264, 290 N.E.2d at 375 (Burman, J., dissenting).
168. See KEETON, supra note 27, at 237 in which it is suggested that courts refusing to allow
the insurance company to invoke an immunity available to the wrongdoer may be "chipping away
another segment of immunity ...."
169. See text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
170. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). Trammel evidences erosion of the traditional judicial attitude toward the marital status. The United States Supreme Court considered
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a woman. . . demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the
dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being."' 7 ' The
modem justifications for interspousal tort immunity warrant close scrutiny to determine whether they compensate for withholding a cause of
172
action from an injured spouse.
A frequently cited argument in favor of interspousal immunity is
that it preserves domestic tranquility. 73 But if one spouse is willing to
bring the other into court to account for some wrong, the implication is
that the domestic situation is already less than harmonious.' 74 Although subjecting a spouse to the rigors of a judicial proceeding may
increase the level of discord, it is the tort itself, not the tort suit, which
likely initiated the spousal conflict. Furthermore, in a case like Elkins,
where the parties are spouse and insurance company rather than husband and wife, denying the spouse's claim will likely cause more domestic unrest than will allowing it.
Interspousal immunity has been further justified by the theory that
the criminal and divorce laws offer adequate remedies to an injured
spouse. 7 5 This assertion is erroneous in that neither a criminal nor a
divorce action can be validly based on mere negligence. 76 But even
assuming arguendo that the criminal and divorce laws sufficed, either
of these routes would certainly be more disruptive to family harmony
than a suit in tort.
The one truly persuasive argument in favor of interspousal immunity is that permitting suits between husband and wife will promote
whether an accused may invoke the privilege against adverse spousal testimony to exclude his
wife's voluntary testimony. By allowing the defendant's wife to testify voluntarily against him,
without his consent, the Court modified the rule laid down in Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S.
74 (1958), which had barred the testimony of one spouse against the other in a criminal proceeding unless both spouses consented.
171. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980).
172. For discussions of the modem justifications for interspousal immunity, see Note, Torts
Between Husbandand Wfe, 30 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 343, 345 (1952); Note, Tort Liability Within the
Family Area-A Suggested Approach, 51 Nw. L. REV. 610, 613 (1956).
173. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Pirc v. Kortebein, 186 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Wis. 1960); Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951); Callow v. Thomas, 332
Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886). But see Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 476, 3 N.E.2d 597,
601 (1936) (Crouch, J., dissenting) ("To urge that [interspousal tort immunity] . . . survives because it is an aid to conjugal peace disregards reality. Conjugal peace would be as seriously jarred
by an action for breach of contract, or on a promissory note, or for an injury to property . . .. all
of which the law permits, as by one for personal injury.")
174. Note, Tort Liability Within the FamilyArea-A Suggested,4pproach, 51 Nw. L. REv. 610,
613 (1956).
175. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Dishon v. Dishon, 187 Ky. 497,
219 S.W. 794 (1920). See also PROSSER, supra note 32, at 862-63.
176. PROSSER, supra note 32, at 863 n.45.
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collusive lawsuits to collect insurance monies.177 Undoubtedly, if such
suits are allowed, the insurance companies-and, through them, the
public-will bear the burden of paying for some fraudulent claims contrived by conniving spouses. But the possibility of fraud exists even in
tort suits between unrelated parties. However, denying a cause of action to all spouses so that some dishonest spouses cannot use the judi78
cial process unfairly is not a proper solution either. 1
The question of the continued utility of interspousal immunity is
79
difficult indeed and one which should not be resolved precipitately.1
Because the courts have been hesitant to abolish the doctrine,18 0 the
question is ripe for legislative reexamination. But until the Illinois legislature sees fit to change the law, Illinois courts must implement the
doctrine and deal objectively with all of its ramifications, including its
effect on entitlement to insurance benefits.
CONCLUSION

The current trend in many jurisdictions is to construe liberally the
phrase "legally entitled to recover" in uninsured motorist policies and
statutes. Although a defense or immunity available to the uninsured
tortfeasor may bar the claimant from suing the tortfeasor directly,
many courts have nonetheless allowed the insured to recover from his
insurance company.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Elkins is in keeping with this trend. While arguments can be
raised in support of the result achieved in Elkins, the rationale em177. Among the cases considering this argument are Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611
(1910); Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1953); Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196
N.Y.S. 113 (1922).
178. Accord, Note, Tor! Liability Within the Family Area--A Suggested Approach, 51 Nw. L.
REV. 610, 614-15 (1956).
179. In Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979), the Supreme Court of Florida refused to
abolish interspousal tort immunity. In a concurring opinion, one of the justices suggested that the
application of interspousal immunity should be relaxed to allow suits between spouses when the
tortfeasor is covered by insurance for his negligent acts. The concurring justice indicated, however, that the legislature, and not the court, should adopt this limited form of immunity. Id. at 355
(McDonald, J., concurring).
180. See, e.g., Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 162 (Del. 1979), wherein the court stated:
We are aware of the modem, widespread criticism of the rationale of the [interspousal immunity] doctrine . . . . But, nonetheless, we think that, in addition to its
time-honored recognition in this State, it retains sufficient merit to warrant continued
adherence ....

(citations omitted)

The court additionally stated that it believed the problem is one more appropriate for legislative
solution than for judicial determination. Id. at 163. See also Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352
(1979). But see Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (1979); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71
(1980); Brown v. Brown, 409 N.E.2d 717 (1980); Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382
(1979) (all abolishing interspousal tort immunity).
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ployed to attain that end is flawed. The Elkins court treated the case as
one wholly of first impression in Illinois, ignoring Heckendorn v. First
National Bank of Ottawa and subsequent decisions which had found
that the 1953 amendment to the Married Women's Act prevented a tort
cause of action from arising between spouses. By basing its opinion on
the premise that such a cause of action can arise in Illinois, the Elkins
court showed a disquieting willingness to reach its desired result
notwithstanding precedent and the risk of confusing the legal nature of
interspousal immunity in the state.
The Elkins decision is disturbing in that it weakens the validity of
the assumption, necessary in a common law society, that a citizen can
rely on case law with confidence that the courts will not lightly change
the law from term to term. It would have been appropriate, at the very
least, for the Elkins court to have acknowledged that it was invalidating
the construction of the 1953 amendment set forth in earlier decisions
and accepted by the Illinois legislature. For the court to have effectively overruled the earlier cases without even recognizing their existence served only to create uncertainty and to cast doubt on the validity
of the conclusion reached in Elkins.
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